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Going forward into the past: 
 
 the resurrection of the EURATOM Treaty 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Unless they are timed out, there is a tendency for treaties and the organisations that are 
associated with them to be recycled and rejuvenated to fit with a contemporary problem. 
This is because there is so much political effort involved in creating the ‘new’ that the  
‘old’ continues to appear attractive. In March 2007 the Member States of the EU adopted 
a new Energy Policy for Europe (EPE). The objective of this strategy is to achieve a 
secure, competitive, and sustainable and carbon free energy supply for the EU27 – an 
increasingly urgent objective in the light of high levels of EU dependency on imported 
energy resources and the impact of energy use on climate change. Energy Commissioner 
Andris Piebalgs had stated in spring 2006 that the nuclear energy industry should 
participate in the debate about shaping the new sustainable EPE. 
 
This paper argues that if the EU is to achieve the policy coherence that is a requirement 
of the development of sustainable and secure energy policy there is an urgent need for 
reform of the Treaty which created the European Atomic Energy Community 
(EURATOM) in 1957. In an ideal world the EURATOM Treaty should be repealed. 
However, the failure to take the opportunity to do so during the Convention on the Future 
of Europe and the subsequent problems associated with the ratification of the 
Constitutional Treaty suggest that such radical reform is unlikely for the foreseeable 
future. The EU’s Member States have neither the capacity nor the political will to take 
the appropriate steps to deal with a Treaty which is based on a traditional statist policy 
paradigm in contrast to that of market functionality now characterising EU energy policy. 
Therefore the anomalous EURATOM Treaty will live on and be adapted to meet the 
regulatory requirements of the nuclear industry in the new millennium.  
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Going forward into the past:  
 
the resurrection of the EURATOM Treaty 
 
Introduction 
 
In 1957 the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC) was established on the basis 
of a Treaty (EURATOM) negotiated between the signatory states which had established 
the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951 (France, Germany, Italy, 
Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxemburg). These signatory states also were involved in 
a more extensive European integration project to establish the European Economic 
Community (EEC) at the same time as the EAEC. The EAEC had a limited focus. It was 
established to provide the conditions for the development of nuclear energy in Europe by 
sharing the resources (financial and technical) required, to provide protection of the 
workers in the industry and the general public and to enable agreements to be developed 
with third parties and international organizations on issues relating to supply and peaceful 
use of the technology. Despite criticisms of the electro-nuclear industry
1 and the 
relevance of the Treaty which supports it, this ‘alien’ in the liberalized European energy 
market celebrated its fiftieth anniversary on March 25
th 2007. A rational approach to 
support the development of a coherent, secure, competitive, sustainable EU energy 
policy
2 would be to repeal the Treaty but recent events and evidence support the view 
that this will not happen.  
 
This paper is posing the question - what is it about this Treaty which makes it so durable? 
Three sub questions underlie the discussion – is the Treaty needed, does the EU have the 
capacity to repeal the Treaty and does the EU have the political willingness to repeal the 
Treaty. Whilst the answers to the first two of the questions are somewhat equivocal, the 
answer to the third question is quite apparent. The EU does not have the political 
willingness to repeal the Treaty. It may be simply a form of political ‘inertia’ – this is 
such an inconsequential issue that it will take too much political effort in return for what 
will be gained by repealing this Treaty. Or it may be in creating the EURATOM’s 
mechanisms for sharing the competence for action in the electronuclear industry the EU 
has created a structure which does not intrude on differing national interests. As such it 
does not pose a ‘threat’ to national policies which has to be addressed. Additionally as the 
evidence from some recent developments reviewed in this paper suggests, despite the 
marked differences in national views about the industry, the Treaty does provide a base 
which may be used by national governments with highly divergent national nuclear 
energy policies to develop integrated action. Thus the argument is that the current ‘status 
quo’ with regard to the EURATOM Treaty, with a ‘separate legal personality’ within the 
European Union,  will remain for some considerable time into the future.  
                                                 
1 For example that EURATOM is considered to be an undemocratic and outdated Treaty by the European 
Parliament and an ‘alien’ based as it is on a paradigm of state intervention in the liberalized energy market 
by the European Renewable Energy Federation and a ‘dinosaur’ by members of the German Parliament. 
2 Commission of the European Communities ( CEC) (2006)”Green Paper – A European Strategy for 
Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy” COM (2006) 105 final, 08.03.2006, Brussels 
and  CEC (2007) “An Energy Policy for Europe” COM (2007) 1 final, 10.01.2007, Brussels. EUSA 0507 EURATOM Treaty  7
 
The paper begins by reviewing the origins of the development of the Treaty before   
moving to commenting on the discussion of the position of EURATOM as one of the 
founding treaties of the EU during the Convention on the Future of Europe. The final 
section of the paper will concentrate on what appears to be the ‘value added’ to the EU of 
this Treaty in the twenty first century. The overall conclusion is that this Treaty does not 
make a significant contribution to the search by the EU for a coherent EU energy policy. 
It does however provide a legal framework for a group of countries with very divergent 
views on the electronuclear industry to co-operate on a number of issues considered to be 
of relevance for integrated action.  
 
European Atomic Energy Community – 
 a difficult ‘birth’. 
 
In the early 1950s the European states urgently needed such an access to reliable energy 
resources in order for the massive reconstruction required in their war torn economies. 
The desire for peaceful co-operation with their neighbours also dominated the policy 
agendas of the countries of Western Europe. Coal was the primary energy source in 
Europe at the time and a major component in the manufacture of steel so committing to 
policy co-operation in coal and steel production was an obvious mechanism for concrete 
action in limited areas which would “…substitute for historic rivalries the merger of their 
essential interests and lay the foundations of a broader and deeper community among peoples 
long divided by bloody conflicts”
3 But in turning to progress European integration post 
1952 a number of controversies were generated as the vested national interests of the 
individual states proved difficult to reconcile.  
 
The strategy for increased policy integration amongst the signatory states of the ECSC 
was undermined when the proposals for a European Defense Community were rejected in 
1954. On the other hand the ECSC had shown that successful policy integration was 
possible in two areas – trade and energy co-operation. So a view developed that if 
national defense policies could not become integrated attention was to be turned to other 
possibilities. In the resolution following the Messina Conference in 1955 the Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs of the ECSC Member States had declared that more and cheaper energy 
policy was fundamental to the economic progress of the European economies. Further 
adding that, “Before long, the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes will open up 
prospects of a new industrial revolution far beyond anything achieved during the past one 
hundred years.” 
4  
 
The civilian use of the nuclear technologies appeared to be an exciting new development 
offering an opportunity to re-energize the enthusiasm and impetus for further policy 
integration and stimulate economic growth. The view held by Monnet, drafting a plan for 
a Treaty incorporating these ideas, was that the nuclear energy sector was de-politicized. 
As such it would be open to political integration and the possibilities of supranational 
                                                 
3 Preamble to the Treaty of Paris, 1951, establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, ECSC.    
4 Resolution adopted by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the ECSC Member States at their meeting at 
Messina on June 1/2
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action. The vision of Monnet and the other proponents of this view was however flawed. 
Support for the nuclear sector and the EURATOM Treaty in 1957 was born, not from the 
rational plan for integration which was proposed by Jean Monnet in 1956 
5, but from 
political compromises brokered during the negotiations of the following year. The 
national nuclear energy programmes of the time were admittedly haphazard but they were 
being developed in response to narrow national interests and commercial pressures. The 
governments were not prepared to pool decision making about national energy policy 
resources and the choices being made about the energy resources ‘mix’. The French 
government supported the growing electronuclear industry in which France had important 
business interests. The German and Italian governments on the other hand were looking 
to forge agreements with the United States to obtain cheap supplies of enriched uranium 
and US built reactors. In Belgium too strong national preferences for national 
developments were expressed. Thus supranational action was constrained as the   
signatory states were not prepared to open their national industry to the possibility of 
‘interference’. 
 
The Preamble to the Treaty did indeed point to wider objectives and its contribution to 
European integration by “Recognising that nuclear energy represents an essential resource for 
the development and invigoration of industry and will permit the advancement of the cause of 
peace”. But the outcome of the 1956/7 negotiations was that the main terms of the Treaty 
founding the European Atomic Energy Community were limited. The specific objective 
of the European Atomic Energy Community was clarified as raising the standards of 
living in its member states “….by creating the conditions for speedy establishment and growth 
of nuclear industries”. To achieve growth in the nuclear sector would be costly as it was 
new technology and would need a great deal of investment. It was not investment which 
the individual member states of the EAEC could afford to make on their own. But if all 
the states worked together to integrate their nuclear energy policies and shared the costs, 
all would benefit from the “…prospect of achievements commensurate with the creative 
capacities of their countries.” (Article 1, EURATOM).  Promotion of the electronuclear 
industry was to be accomplished through the promotion of research and the dissemination 
of the information gained as a result. Competence for the management of some aspects of 
resource supply and some safety related issues was also to be transferred to the 
Community. The safety of the nuclear installations themselves was to remain within the 
competences of the national government.  
 
Overall the Treaty conformed to a traditional statist model of intergovernmental 
agreement for action in a limited sectoral policy area. It was much narrower in focus than 
the European Economic Community Treaty (EEC), also signed at the same time. 
Moravscik going so far as to describe the Treaty as “… a ‘smokescreen’ for the more 
controversial customs union” 
6. The role for the General Assembly 
7 of the EAEC was 
minimal. As a consequence of no substantial changes being made to the Treaty since 
                                                 
5 Report to the Committee established under the chairmanship of Paul-Henri Spaak to ‘relaunch’ the 
European Project following the failure of the European Defence Community.  
6 Moravscik A (1998:120) “The Choice for Europe” Cornell University Press. 
7 As a result of the Merger Treaty in 1967 the institutions of the three 1950s communities were merged, 
including the General Assembly of the EAEC, with those of the ECSC and the EEC, becoming the 
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1957, the European Parliament continues to have a minimal role. Furthermore, the 
objective of promotion of nuclear energy appeared to be contradictory to the objective of 
promotion of use of coal supported in the ECSC Treaty. The terms of the Treaty were to 
facilitate investment in the nuclear industry. As the electricity utilities were 
predominantly state owned in the 1950s this was in effect to agree to a considerable 
degree of state aid going to the developing industry. 
 
The EURATOM Treaty conferred on the EAEC the sole rights of option and ownership 
of all fissile material being used for civilian purposes creating a nuclear common market 
for trade in nuclear ores and materials within the EU so that sufficient supplies would be 
available for Community users (Chapter IV EURATOM). 
8 The provisions of the Treaty 
brought international agreements and co-operation to the European Commission’s 
competence as a necessary element of the common supply of the raw materials for the 
industry. The EURATOM Treaty also provided the basis for the free movement of the 
staff, capital and services required in the nuclear sector. The supranational action was 
limited and exclusive Community competence for action focused on eight main areas 
which were outlined in Article 2 with prominence being given to safety of the workers in 
the industry and the public in the areas surrounding the nuclear power plants.
9  A notable 
omission from Article 2 were measures to ensure safety of the nuclear installations 
themselves. These remained within the competences of the national governments and 
                                                 
8 The EURATOM Supplies Agency (ESA) was established on June 1st 1960 to ensure the equitable and 
regular supplies of nuclear ores and fuels for the EU’s nuclear utilities (Chapter IV EURATOM Treaty). 
The Agency is a common supply agency for ores, source materials and special fissile materials and under 
the supervision of the European Commission. Currently this is within DG TREN. However “The Supplies 
Agency exists, but is a mere shadow of what was intended” (European Parliament ( 2002:xiii) “The EP and 
the EURATOM Treaty: past, present and future”, Energy and Research Paper ENER 114, European 
Parliament. In 2006 the ESA had merely 10 employees. As the EU is highly dependent on imported 
uranium supplies then the ESA arguably has a role to play in the future in monitoring imports. 
 
9 Article 2 EURATOM  In order to perform its task, the Community shall, as provided in this Treaty:  
a. promote research and ensure the dissemination of technical information; 
b.  establish uniform safety standards to protect the health of workers and of the general public and ensure that 
they are applied; 
c.  facilitate investment and ensure, particularly by encouraging ventures on the part of undertakings, the 
establishment of the basic installations necessary for the development of nuclear energy in the Community; 
d.  ensure that all users in the Community receive a regular and equitable supply of ores and nuclear fuels; 
e.  make certain, by appropriate supervision, that nuclear materials are not diverted to purposes other than those 
for which they are intended; 
f.  exercise the right of ownership conferred upon it with respect to special fissile materials; 
g.  ensure wide commercial outlets and access to the best technical facilities by the creation of a common market 
in specialised materials and equipment, by the free movement of capital for investment in the field of nuclear energy 
and by freedom of employment for specialists within the Community; 
h.  establish with other countries and international organizations such relations as will foster progress in the 
peaceful uses of nuclear energy’. 
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authorities. But the European Commission was given considerable power and autonomy 
in the implementation of the action identified for supranational competence.  
 
The creation of the European Atomic Energy Community was not a commitment by the 
national governments of the six signatory states to any form of co-operation on the 
military use of nuclear technology. The underlying political philosophy for the creation 
of the EAEC was a search for peaceful co-operation not collaboration so that weapons of 
war could be developed. The underlying political realities of the 1950s were dominated 
by reluctance of national governments to proceed with strategic and military integration 
in a context other than North Atlantic Treaty Organization combined with on-going 
military actions involving national forces outside the European region. The EURATOM 
Treaty therefore contained measures to ensure that the fissile materials being used in the 
nuclear power plants of the EAEC were being used for peaceful purposes. The 
EURATOM Safeguards Office (ESO) was established to deal with measures to ensure all 
EU states do not divert or acquire materials away from their intended and declared uses 
(Chapter VII EURATOM). The ESO is now based under the supervision of the European 
Commission (DG TREN)
10 with more robust mechanisms in place and a much clearer 
role and mandate than the ESA now has.
11
 
A range of safeguards have since been developed within the framework of the 
EURATOM Treaty, monitored by the ESO, to ensure that materials being used in the 
electronuclear industry are not diverted for military purposes. They include measures 
which are applied to power stations, fuel fabrication and re-processing plants. The type of 
safeguard measures applied will vary, depending on the nature of the nuclear facility but 
they include audits of material use, analysis of the use of materials, surveillance and on-
site inspections. For example a power station where there is on-site spent fuel storage will 
be subject to audits of materials, containment and surveillance measures, including closed 
circuit TV monitoring, and random re-verification procedures to ensure that  the 
identified stocks of materials are still present on site.  
 
The electronuclear industry is also subject to action based on the articles of the European 
Economic Community (EEC) Treaty. Electricity is a product which may be moved within 
the integrated market, irrespective of how it is generated. During the 1990s and early 
2000s legislation has been adopted to liberalize national markets in electricity and thus 
reduce prices for domestic, commercial and industrial users by enabling competition to 
take place. Although trade in electricity within the EU remains relatively limited, these 
                                                 
10 DG TREN was formed in 1999 by a merger of the former DG VII (Transport) with DG XVII (Energy) 
and the unit for Nuclear Safety of DG XI (Environment, Nuclear Safety and Civil Protection). In the 
European Commission 2004-2009 two Commissioners held the portfolios for Transport, Jacques Barrot, 
and Energy  Andris Piebalgs. (Two directorates responsible for nuclear policy, nuclear safeguards and 
radiation protection within DG TREN are not based in Brusssels but in Luxemburg).  
11 In 2002 a High Level Expert Group was established to report on the effectiveness of the ESO as the 
terms of the EURATOM Treaty had not been revised since 1957. The findings of the Group were that the 
ESO should remain the focus of EU wide controls for both practical and legal reasons.  “The EURATOM 
Treaty being a “…remarkable document that expresses the essential commitments of the parties in a 
flexible and forward-looking language” (CEC 2002:7) High Level Expert Group Review of the EURATOM 
Safeguards Office.  EUSA 0507 EURATOM Treaty  11
developments have increased the pressures to ensure interoperability of national 
transmission networks. As a consequence a number of issues not referred to in the 
EURATOM Treaty such as safe management and disposal of radioactive waste are 
gaining in prominence on the policy agenda of the EU. The results of public opinion 
surveys conducted by the European Commission show that 53% of the Europeans 
perceive nuclear power as more of a risk than an advantage with lack of confidence in the 
safe disposal of radioactive waste, the protection of radioactive materials against misuse 
and fear of terrorist attacks on nuclear facilities featuring amongst a high proportion of 
respondents concerns.
12   
 
The resilient ‘alien’ 
 
The EURATOM Treaty has shown remarkable resilience to remain substantially 
unchanged throughout the history of the EU.
13  This is despite radical changes to the 
other Treaties founding the European Economic Community and the European Coal and 
Steel Community In addition from the 1970s, and following the impact on the European 
economy of the global oil price crisis, the EU has adopted an energy policy which is 
increasingly based on the underlying paradigm of market functionality. A Treaty based as 
it is on a high level of state support for an energy sector appears to be no longer relevant 
in such a scenario. But no significant proposals to repeal or amend the Treaty have been  
made.  
 
There was a lack of confidence in the effectiveness of the Treaty’s mechanisms in the late 
1980s during a period of doubt about the industry and its safety (most notably raised by 
the Chernobyl disaster of 1986). Although some discussion of the continued usefulness of 
the Treaty did take place then no moves were made to abolish or amend the EURATOM 
Treaty.  It may have been because it appeared to be of little consequence for most 
Member States, apart from France, and would have taken too much political effort to 
change for little gain in most instances. Or it may have been that the mechanisms for 
sharing the competence for action in the electronuclear industry the EU had created a 
structure which did not intrude on the national interests. As such it did not pose a ‘threat’ 
to national policies which had to be addressed. Certainly the Treaty, and the action taken 
by the EU states within the context of international agreements on safety standards, had 
provided the basis for a comprehensive safety regime in the reactors in Western Europe 
which was not present in those of Soviet design and control such as those used at the 
Chernobyl nuclear power plant.  
 
Responding to public concerns, licensing of the construction of reactors declined and 
closures of some units were initiated during the 1990s. The economics of the industry had 
altered and it appeared that the electronuclear industry was no longer viable because of 
                                                 
12 CEC (2007) “Europeans and Nuclear Safety” Special Eurobarometer Report 271, February 2007.  
13 The Merger Treaty of 1967 merged the institutional structures of the ECSC, the EEC Treaty and the 
EURATOM Treaty but did not change the provisions of any of the Treaties. In contrast the ECSC Treaty 
expired in 2002 and the EEC Treaty has been subject to successive changes (the Single European Act, 
1987, the Treaty on European Union (TEU), 1993, and the amendments of the Treaty of Amsterdam, 1999, 
and Nice, 2003). EUSA 0507 EURATOM Treaty  12
the heavy investment costs required in the construction of the nuclear power plants. For 
some opposing the nuclear sector it appeared that the market was operating and would 
ensure the ‘death’ of the industry. However despite reactor closures, newer technology 
developments in those which remained increased the efficiency levels of the operating 
reactors. The result was that by the early 2000s the electronuclear industry was able to 
provide one-third of the electricity being used within the EU15, with the EU 25 being by 
2005 the world’s largest nuclear electricity generating region. 
14  
 
In 2002 the European Parliament had concluded that the Treaty was out-dated, 
undemocratic and biased towards the electronuclear industry and proposed that the Treaty 
should be phased out at the same time as the ECSC Treaty was due to expire. More 
recently the objectives of EURATOM Treaty have been castigated as it “…carries the 
stigma of an undemocratic, outdated alien in the world of the liberalized market”. 
15 These 
criticisms of lack of democracy come from a number of aspects of the Treaty provisions. 
They primarily relate to the unchanged nature of the Treaty which dates from the period 
prior to the introduction of direct elections to the EP in 1979. As a consequence of this 
there is no requirement for the Council of Ministers to do anything more than formally 
consult the EP on substantive issues. Under the provisions of the EURATOM Treaty the 
unelected European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) and the Scientific and 
Technical Committee (with a membership nominated by national governments) have 
similar formal rights of consultation as the European Parliament. Article 101 EURATOM 
excludes the EP from involvement in international agreements based on its terms.  Yet 
the EP is co-budgetary authority for all the expenditure which is based on the Treaty. 
 
EURATOM legislation is subject to vote by qualified majority (QMV) in the Council of 
Ministers, but not to the co-decision procedures.  In other areas of action covered by the 
provisions of the Economic Community (TEC) there have been substantial changes made 
to the role of the EP which now has the power to act as co-legislator with the Council on 
a considerable number of market related issues which have an impact on the electro-
nuclear industry.  As there are a number of safety related issues considered of importance 
to the public the EP view is that “(I)t can be plausibly argued that it is precisely in these areas 
…..relating to safety that the public most feels the need for rigorous democratic scrutiny, control 
and accountability” 
16 and thus supporting more opportunity for the EP to perform an 
active role in the EAEC decision making process. 
                                                 
14 CEC (2006:3) “Nuclear Illustrative Programme” COM (2006) 844 final, Brussels. 
15 Fouquet D (2005) “The Legal Perspective: the EURATOM Treaty and the new Constitution” 
presentation to Energy Intelligence for Europe conference, 23 September, Copenhagen 2003, 
http://www.energyintelligence for Europe.dk 
15 EP (2002:2) 
16 European Parliament (EP) (2002:2) The EP and the EURATOM Treaty; past, present and future. Energy 
and Research Paper ENER 114, European Parliament. EUSA 0507 EURATOM Treaty  13
The Convention on the Future of Europe and EURATOM 
 
The most recent debate about the founding 
17 Treaties of the EU was that of the 
Convention on the Future of Europe in 2002 and 2003. The Convention was an 
innovative format for the discussion of Treaty changes. Legally the outcome of the 
Convention would require the convening of an Intergovernmental Conference of the 
Heads of Government of the EU States to decide on any proposals for change. But the 
Heads of Government of the EU Member States “…had through an ingenious blend of 
ambition and ambiguity left the objective of the Convention entirely open-ended. If the 
Convention wished to do so, it could change the face of the Union, or create the impression that it 
has changed or perhaps merely tinkered at the edges.”
18 Given the timetable which the 
Convention was required to work towards, merely 18 months, it is both surprising how 
much was accomplished and unsurprising that Valery Giscard d-Estaing, as Convention 
President, and Jean-Luc Dehaene and Guiliano Amato, as his deputies, should have 
directed the deliberations in the way in which they appear to have done.  
 
Although identified as one of the four founding Treaties, little attention was paid to the 
EURATOM Treaty during the Convention. Certainly it appeared to have little time 
devoted to deliberations about its articles. The approach which was initially favoured by 
Giscard d-Estaing was to make only minor technical adjustments to the Treaty and 
‘import’ its the articles wholesale into the Constitutional Treaty. This however prompted 
disagreement from a number of Convention delegates and environmental groups. The 
major objection to the inclusion of the EURATOM Treaty in the Constitutional Treaty 
centred on a view that by including it in body of the Treaty, supranational action by the 
Union would be extended to areas over which national governments would not want 
interference (ie the choice of energy resources). It would also seem to introduce an 
obligation for all Member States of the EU to introduce nuclear power plants and 
reactors.  
 
Despite not devoting much time to the EURATOM Treaty the Convention did consider a 
number of alternative scenarios for the EURATOM Treaty some of the main ones being 
discussed below. They included repeal of the Treaty, additions to the Treaty and/or 
simplification of its terms. Convention Working Group III considering the EU’s Legal 
Personality, was charged with the responsibility to determine what the consequences 
would be of explicit recognition of the legal personality of the EU and of a fusion of the 
legal personalities of the EU and the European Community. The Working Group 
concluded in their Final Report that merging the EURATOM Treaty with the TEU was 
subject to the same rationale as that being adopted for the merging of the pillars of the 
TEC and the TEU and would allow provisions of the Treaty which were similar to 
articles of the TEC to be deleted. However as there were certain specific problems 
                                                 
17 These were identified as the European Coal and Steel Community Treaty, the European Community 
Treaty, the EURATOM Treaty and the Treaty on European Union 
18  Milton G and Keller-Noellet  J (2005:30) “The European Constitution – its origins, negotiation and 
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relating to the EURATOM Treaty it was felt that the implications of the merger of the 
Treaty should be investigated in more detail. 
19  
 
Amongst the more controversial of the objectives of the EURATOM Treaty is that of 
support for the electronuclear industry. State aid to industry is carefully monitored and 
controlled by the TEC yet it is actively encouraged for the industry through the terms of 
the EURATOM Treaty. Merging the EURATOM Treaty had the potential to resolve 
some of the criticisms made of the contradictions of maintaining a Treaty supporting a 
particular sector of the energy industry in an increasingly liberalized energy market. The 
essential thrust of another proposal which came from an alternate group of Convention 
members (the ‘Nagy’ proposal), was for repeal of the Treaty which had as its main 
objective the maintenance of a ‘special economic zone’ for nuclear power 
20. It was 
proposed by the ‘Nagy’ group that the timetable which the EP had outlined in 2000 to 
phase out the Treaty by 2007 (ie giving it a lifespan of 50 years as the ECSC Treaty) 
should be followed. As this timetable would also coincide with the beginning of the EU’s 
Seventh Framework Programme of Research and Technology Development (FP7) (2007-
2013) it would enable changes to be made to the allocation of funding for nuclear 
technology research. However  this group did also propose that the nine key functions 
remaining of the Treaty (including health and safety, safeguards and investment) should 
be transferred to Part III of the Constitution dealing with the Policies and Functioning of 
the Union.   
 
The group considered that the lack of consensus amongst the Member States of the EU 
with regard to nuclear energy made it politically unacceptable to maintain the Treaty. 
This was based on the view that there had been consensus on the nuclear sector in 1957, 
and that as the consensus was no longer apparent in the 2000s the Treaty should be 
repealed. Given the difficulties surrounding the agreement on the terms of the Treaty in 
1957 it is difficult to accept this as a credible view and therefore as a rationale for repeal 
of the Treaty.  National self interest in 1957 had created a difficult policy environment 
and consensus was difficult to achieve on anything more than limited action. The 
divergence of views of the EU’s Member States towards this energy source appears to be 
the broad in 2007 – ergo it would be difficult to agree to supranational action on such a 
controversial aspect of national energy policies.   
 
The ‘sunset’ clause was one favoured by some of the Convention members, some 
Member States (notably Austria and Ireland) and some of the non-governmental 
organizations 
21 which had campaigned during the Convention in support of the repeal of 
the Treaty. The ‘sunset’ clause was based on the 2002 proposal of the European 
Parliament for the EURATOM Treaty to expire after 50 years (ie in 2007), using the 
model adopted for the ECSC Treaty. This proposal differed from the ‘Nagy’ proposal 
                                                 
19 Secretariat of the European Convention (2003), Suggested Approach for the EURATOM Treaty, CONV 
621/03 Brussels, 14
th March 
20 Secretariat of the European Convention (2003) Contribution made by Ms Marie Nagy, Ms Renee Wagner 
and Mr Neil McCormick “The Future of the EURATOM Treaty in the framework of the European 
Constitution” CONTRIB 250, CONV 563/03, Brussels. 18
th February. 
21 Greenpeace activists going so far as to leave 15 barrels of fake radioactive waste at the doors of the EP 
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which also advocated using the EP’s timetable as it’s basis was for the Convention to 
recognize that the EURATOM Treaty was out of date but to leave the work of deciding 
what should be done instead to a subsequent intergovernmental conference.  
 
In the proposal which came from Convention member Klaus Hansch a number of options 
for the future of the EURATOM Treaty were considered which ranged from a ‘spring 
clean’ of the Treaty, additions to the Treaty and repeal of the Treaty 
22 Amongst the 
options also considered by Hansch was that of the conversion of the EA into an energy 
treaty with the addition of articles relating to renewable energy resources to provide the 
EU with the legitimacy to deal with climate change policy. It would also give the 
EURATOM Treaty  “…with its at times old-world air, a new modernity and purposefulness” 
23.  
A note of caution was however sounded about the repeal of the Treaty in that this might 
result in a re-nationalization of nuclear energy policy and make co-ordination between 
Member States on waste disposal or safety issues more difficult. 
 
A task force, convened by Francois Lamoureux, the Director General of DG TREN, 
presented a proposal for an Additional Act to be added to the Constitution on the 
Peaceful Use of Atomic Energy (this proposal was known as the ‘Penelope Paper’). The 
proposal was based on a view that a European Constitution could be developed without 
the EURATOM Treaty included in its provisions. The Penelope paper presented an 
“Additional Act to the Constitutional Treaty on the peaceful use of Atomic Energy”. The 
objective of the Penelope paper was to make the Treaty more compatible with the EU’s 
electricity market. The main thrust was to simplify the Treaty by identifying and 
removing those provisions which duplicated those in the Treaty of Economic Community 
particularly those relating to promotion of research, dissemination of information and on 
the institutions and external relations. It was also proposed to remove certain provisions 
on right of option on uranium ores and property ownership which were and continue to 
be considered to be obsolete as “…the internal market for uranium is a completely dead 
chapter…” Commeau-Yannoussis N (2005) 
24   
 
The Penelope Paper proposals also sought to address the inconsistency of the role of the 
EP between the EURATOM Treaty and the TEC and supported the extension of QMV 
and co-decision to nuclear energy policy proposing that “…Parliament is restored to the 
institutional system, as it is given the power to adopt with the Council, ‘Laws’ for basic standards 
whereas at present it is very much outside the decision-making process”. 
25 This continues to be 
the view of the European Commission “…the first and the most important in many ways 
would be to give the EP a greater role rather than just a consultative one. Make more decisions, 
co-decisions with a qualified majority voting for more issues”. 
26
                                                 
22 Secretariat of the European Convention (2002) Contribution made by Mr Klaus Hansch  “The Future of 
the EURATOM Treaty”  CONTRIB 121 , CONV 344/02, Brussels. 14
th October. 
23  CONV 344/02:4 
24 Commeau-Yannoussis N (2005) Speech presented at “The EURATOM Treaty and future energy options” 
Conference organised by NOAH, Friends of the Earth, Denmark, held at the Danish Parliament building, 
Christiansborg, Denmark 23
rd September 2005.  
25 The “Penelope Paper” first premlinary draft submitted to the Convention on the Future of Europe, 
prepared by task force led by Francois Lamoureux, Director-General DG TREN 
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Some of the Treaty provisions which were identified by DG TREN as still of value 
included those on the setting of safety standards for health and safety (but bringing in the 
safety of nuclear installations)  
27, the provisions on investment in , joint undertakings 
and the safeguards measures to ensure that nuclear materials in the EU states were not 
diverted from their intended uses as declared by the users. These measures were to 
remain subject to supranational action and the established role of the European 
Commission to monitor and report and in some cases approve of national measures. The 
proposals on the simplification of the Treaty and the attempts to ensure that there were no 
overlapping areas with the TEC were realistic and pragmatic in nature. However in other 
areas particularly as the supranational authority to take the lead on matters of security and 
safety the autonomy of the European Commission remained unaltered in this proposal.  
 
Of the alternative proposals for the EURATOM Treaty the option proposed by Klaus 
Hansch to repeal the Treaty and subsume its articles into an Energy Treaty or Treaty 
chapter is the one which would make the most effective way contribution to the EU’s 
goal of a competitive and sustainable EU Energy Policy. Whilst climate change continues 
to generate debate amongst many groups about its impact and the speed at which it is 
taking place two realities are evident – one is that climate change is taking place and the 
second is that energy resources and their use play a significant part in producing those 
gases which appear to be damaging to the environment.  Energy Policy has a key role to 
play in any strategy to achieve the objectives of sustainable development and economic 
growth to which the EU is committed.  
 
However it was not considered appropriate to substantially amend the Treaty or to change 
its nature from that of primary legislation
28 during the Convention. The EURATOM 
Treaty was regarded by the Praesidium of the Convention as a distinct, complex and 
technical subject which it was not appropriate for the Convention to consider. This view 
went unchallenged by most members of the Convention.  As Andrew Duff, a Convention 
member, concluded “Given the essentially controversial nature of nuclear power but also 
because of lack of time the Convention was unable to reach consensus on whether to repeal, 
assimilate or amend the EURATOM Treaty.” 
29
 
Instead it was decided to incorporate any changes which were required for the 
EURATOM Treaty into a Protocol annexed to the Constitutional Treaty.
30 The changes 
were quite small and related mainly to the adaptation of the Treaty to the new rules for 
institutional and financial arrangements. The Treaty’s legal ‘personality’ remained 
unchanged.  The limited role of the EP in the decision making process was also 
unchanged. In addition to the Protocol to amend the Treaty a Declaration was also 
                                                 
27 “Each Member State shall lay down the appropriate provisions ….to ensure compliance with the basic 
standards which have been established. The Commission shall make appropriate recommendations 
…..including those regarding the safety of installations” Article 3 Additional Act to the Constitution No “ 
Peaceful Use of Atomic Energy – the ‘Penelope Paper’. 
28 Secretariat of the European Convention (2003:paras 2,5b (ii), Suggested Approach for the EURATOM 
Treaty. CONV 621/03, Brussels, March 14
th. 
29 Duff A (2006:167), The Struggle for Europe’s Constitution, Federal Trust. 
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appended to the Constitutional Treaty. This Declaration on behalf of the States of 
Germany, Ireland, Hungary, Austria and Sweden noted that the EURATOM provisions 
had not been altered since 1957 and supporting the idea of an inter-governmental 
conference to review it as soon a possible 
31. But not all the Member States with 
criticisms of the EURATOM Treaty signed the Declaration, Denmark being a notable 
exception. (Denmark is a state with a strong anti-nuclear policy where there has been 
significant investment in the development of alternative renewable sources of electricity 
generation particularly in wind power development). During the IGC which followed 
under the Italian and Irish presidencies it was evident that deliberations about the EA 
would not be included in the discussions. In the Irish White Paper on the European 
Constitution published in June 2005, following the IGC it was concluded that “….At the 
IGC, while Ireland and some other Member States proposed a more extensive debate on 
EURATOM it was clear that there was no consensus in support of this” 
32   
 
This outcome for the EURATOM Treaty was not unexpected from the Convention or the 
IGC. The EURATOM Treaty was framed as a traditional statist model Treaty based on 
intergovernmental action. Divergent national interests and policies remained at the heart 
of the debate in the Convention. The Treaty was not part of the pillar structure of the 
Treaty on European Union which was under scrutiny by the working groups of the 
Convention. It could not be used to identify the core values of the Union which the 
citizens of the EU could appreciate. It is addressing issues in a narrow field of economic 
activity. The Convention on the Future of Europe was not an intergovernmental 
conference of the type convened in the past by the national governments of the EU to 
amend the Treaties. Instead, it “….was a conscious effort to encourage a debate with all 
sections of society.  It is difficult to conclude that the content of this debate had any major 
influence on its outcome. But it had a symbolic impact in that it demonstrated the determination 
of Europe’s leaders to break with the past, there was to be no more secret diplomacy; instead the 
people were being consulted not just at the end of the process but throughout”. 
33 But the 
EURATOM Treaty is dealing with a particular sector of industry which is reluctant to 
engage in open debate and so unwilling to engage with the approach being advocated in 
the Convention format. 
 
The evidence from the debate during the Convention and the lack of willingness of the 
Member States of the EU to deliberate changes or repeal of the Treaty demonstrates how 
difficult it would be to negotiate an alternative.  The electronuclear industry is a divisive 
issue on which it is difficult to reach agreement amongst the Member States. Support for 
the continued existence of the Treaty is also split amongst the EU’s Member States. 
Competence for the EU and the EU’s institutions in energy policy is the subject of 
difficult and highly political debate. In turn this has created a difficult and crowded 
policy environment in which to develop an EU nuclear energy policy. The variables of 
the energy policy environment of the 2000s do differ from those of 1957 but the outcome 
is the same – divergent national policies which are difficult to reconcile.   
  
                                                 
31 Declaration 44 annexed to the Constitutional Treaty 
32 Irish Government (2005:92) The European Constitution – White Paper, Dept of Foreign Affairs, June 
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The new Energy Policy for Europe and the nuclear ‘option’. 
 
The energy system of the European Union is reliant on fossil fuels which because of the 
intensity of their usage have had major detrimental impacts on the environment. The 
European Union is heavily dependent on imported supplies of the fossil fuels needed to 
meet its growing energy demand. An increasing element of this demand is being met by 
the use of renewable sources of energy which have the advantages of being indigenous 
and less damaging to the environment. However the evidence would suggest that the 
renewable technologies are not able to match the growing demand for energy – a demand 
which is not solely within the EU but is global as more than 2 billion people remain 
unable to access a secure supply of electricity with all the attendant problems which this 
brings. Increased global demand for energy will impact on the resources which the EU 
and the developing world are increasingly competing for. It is in this context that 
governments and the EU in recent years have looked with more interest at the benefits of 
the nuclear option.   
 
In March 2006 the European Commission launched the debate about how the European 
Union was to achieve the competitive, sustainable and secure energy policy which is 
required for the future. During the debate which ensued between March 2006 and March 
2007 it was evident that the national governments of the EU continue to ‘jealously’ guard 
their competence to choose their national energy policies, particularly their rights to 
choose the mix of energy resources which they use.
34. There is determined opposition to 
the nuclear sector from states such as Austria, opposition which has continued since the 
1980s. In other EU states nuclear electricity is the most cost effective (Slovakia), widely 
used (France) and provider of 50% of electricity needs (Belgium, Sweden).  
 
Inability to meet demand with alternative sources was a major factor in the decision of 
French and Finnish governments in the period 2005-2007 to commission new reactors 
and for the Lithuanian, Latvian, Estonian and Polish governments to enter into discussion 
for a joint project to build a new reactor at the Ignalina site in Lithuania. Bulgaria and 
Romania, acceding to the EU in January 2007 have a high level of dependency on the 
electronuclear industry and so support its continuance. Italy which phased out its nuclear 
power plants following a referendum in 1987, is in a somewhat ambivalent position with 
regard to the electronuclear industry. The country is the world’s largest importer of 
electricity from a variety of sources, including from nuclear generation. The Italian state-
owned utility ENEL has a 12.5% stake in a new reactor being constructed in France and 
its subsidiary Slovenske Elektrame operates nuclear reactors in Slovakia. (see also Annex 
1) 
 
During the Brussels European Council, March 8
th/ 9
th 2007 the European Commission 
presented an Action Plan for an Energy Policy for Europe which would achieve the aims 
of increasing the security of energy supply, ensuring the competitiveness of European 
economies and the availability of energy and at the same time promoting environmental 
sustainability and combating climate change. This Action Plan was accepted by the 
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European Council and accompanied by some ambitious targets to achieve curbs in 
greenhouse gas emissions the European Council  “…emphasizes that the EU is committed to 
transforming Europe into a highly energy-efficient and low greenhouse gas emitting economy”
35.  
 
Whilst it is acknowledged in the Energy Policy for Europe Action Plan 
36 that no single 
element of policy provides all the answers and that energy policy must be addressed by 
many different policy areas there appears to be growing support for the use of nuclear 
energy. “It is for each Member to decide whether or not to rely on nuclear electricity…in the 
event that the level of nuclear energy reduces …it is essential that this reduction is phased in with 
the introduction of other supplementary, low-carbon energy sources….otherwise the objective of 
cutting GHG emissions and improving security of energy supply will not be met….In the current 
energy context, the IEA expects the world-wide use of nuclear power to increase” 
37. In addition 
the industry representatives have identified “A new spirit of realism has forced governments to 
acknowledge that nuclear energy offers the best chance of combating climate change and 
ensuring the secure supply of electricity that the world craves.” 
38
 
In this context the economic benefit of maintaining and developing the EU’s 
technological lead in this field is also highlighted in the EPE. At EU level a role is 
identified  “….to develop further, in conformity with Community law, the most advanced 
framework for nuclear energy in those Member States that choose nuclear power, meeting the 
highest standards of safety, security and non-proliferation as required by the EURATOM 
Treaty….”
39. Further “Recalling that the EPE will fully respect Member States’ choice of energy 
mix the European Council notes the Commission’s assessment of the contribution of nuclear 
energy in meeting the growing concerns about safety of energy supply and CO2 emissions 
reductions while ensuring that nuclear safety and security are paramount in the decision-making 
process, confirms that it is for each and every Member State to decide whether to rely on nuclear 
energy and stresses that this has to be done while further improving nuclear safety and the 
management of radioactive waste….” 
40.  Views which were endorsed by the European 
Parliament which “Considers it vital that the European energy strategy should be based on 
maximum subsidiarity and that decisions concerning the energy mix should remain the 
prerogative of the EU member states”. 
41 But “Urges the Commission to investigate the 
development of nuclear energy in Member States, taking account of both the benefits of that 
technology (low volatility of production costs and no CO2 emissions) and the risks linked to the 
existence of nuclear power stations (failures and waste disposal)”
42.  
 
As these statements are also coupled with proposals to establish an EU High Level Group 
on Nuclear Safety and Security and enhanced co-operation with the International Atomic 
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36 CEC (2007:18) “An Energy Policy for Europe” COM (2007) 1 final, Brussels, 10.01.20 
37Ibid CEC (2007:18)  
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Energy Agency (IAEA)
43 on issues such as non proliferation and nuclear safety and 
security it would appear that support is continuing for the nuclear industry and the 
EURATOM Treaty within the EU.   
 
Value ‘added’ of the Treaty? 
 
So to return to the question - why has EURATOM Treaty, an undemocratic and outdated 
alien in the liberalized energy market of the European Union proved to be so durable. Is it 
because the EU’s national governments lack the political willingness to repeal the 
Treaty? Yes undoubtedly, but this seemingly simple answer encompasses a number of 
motivations including those of other actors in the political process in particular the 
European Commission and the electronuclear industry itself. It is also based on 
significant controversies within the national energy policies of the EU’s Member States 
which would be as difficult to resolve in 2007 if a Treaty on supranational action on 
nuclear energy policy was broached as it was in 1957. But the urgency to meet the 
challenges facing the EU in developing a secure, competitive and sustainable energy 
policy are greater in 2007 as the EU is operating in a very different geo-political and geo-
economic world.  
 
The EURATOM Treaty forms part of the ‘energy acquis’ of the EU which all states 
accept on their accession. It would be legally possible for a Member State to withdraw 
from the European Atomic Energy Community as it continues to have a separate legal 
personality from that of the European Union. However in practical terms this may prove 
to be difficult. The Merger Treaty in 1967 brought together into a single set of institutions 
the work of the three Communities and thus gave the European Commission a 
considerable element of autonomy of action in the area of nuclear safety and protection of 
health. This has been developed into what is considered by the IAEA to represent a high 
level of safety which does not require duplication of effort in order to monitor what is 
done within the EU’s Member States. In order to meet their international obligations in 
the absence of the mechanisms of the EURATOM Treaty the EU’s Member States would 
be required to initiate alternative mechanisms.  
 
There is no provision made in the EURATOM Treaty for the withdrawal of a Member 
State from the EAEC. If a Member State wished to do so this could only be achieved with 
through a re-negotiation and ratification of the Treaty by all its signatories. The events 
surrounding the Convention debates and the interest amongst some Member States of the 
EU in preserving the nuclear ‘option’ in their national energy policies demonstrates how 
difficult re-negotiation of this Treaty would be.  The EURATOM Treaty does provide a 
legal framework for action in areas where these differences may make it impossible to 
establish co-operation both within the EU’s Member States and with the broader 
international community where many concerns about the nuclear sector are also evident. 
There thus appears to be ‘value added’ for the European Union from the continued 
existence of the EURATOM Treaty.  In the light of the lack of political willingness to 
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make changes it is perhaps better to have this Treaty with all its flaws than no Treaty at 
all.  
 
A number of categories of ‘risk’ have been identified in association with the nuclear 
sector which are discussed below. They include the cost of the technology and in 
particular de-commissioning of the large number of now-ageing European reactors, 
safety (including safe operation of reactors, prevention of accidents, safety in the context 
of terrorism attack at nuclear power plants), waste disposal, in particular long term 
management of waste and the possibilities of nuclear weapons proliferation if the use of 
nuclear technology is increased.  
a) No technology is the cheapest in all situations 
To turn to the issue of costs first, it is evident is that none of the most commonly used 
technologies is the cheapest in all situations – there is both room and need for coal, gas 
and nuclear to be utilized 
44 The economics of the electro-nuclear industry, long 
considered to be the major obstacle to its development, appears more favourable in 2007 
in comparison with the increasing costs of other energy sources. (c.f Annex 2). The cost 
of generation of electricity depends on a number of factors including the location of the 
plant, the price of the fuel used (apart from that for some renewables), the costs of labour 
in the industry and the costs of borrowing to pay for the construction of the required 
power plant. Unlike other major producers of electricity, coal and natural gas, nuclear 
prices are not determined by fluctuations in price of the basic raw materials. The price of 
nuclear electricity is mainly from the capital costs needed for the nuclear power plants. 
An advantage of the electronuclear electricity for the consumer is the stability of price 
and availability which may be assured. In combination these factors have led to a 
significant growth in support for the nuclear sector which is further enhanced by concerns 
about the rising price for oil and natural gas.  
 
The EURATOM Treaty is based on the paradigm of a high level of state support for the 
development of the new technologies because of the high costs entailed. As such the 
Treaty supports what is an out-dated concept in EU energy policy where the paradigm of 
market functionality appears to have replaced it. The argument of this paper is not that it 
is desirable to maintain this support for the electro-nuclear industry. Rather the argument 
is that in the light of a number of practical issues with regard to the provision of 
alternative sources of energy a pragmatic decision has to be taken about the use of the 
technology. The costs of the renewable and other alternative sources of low carbon 
energy remain high, the nuclear option is therefore considered by many national 
governments as the way forward to meet their national energy demands (c.f Annex 1).  
 
Whilst there is strong support for the completion of the internal markets for gas and 
electricity through the adoption of market opening Directives and Regulations the 
accompanying measures needed to ensure that this happens appear also to require high 
levels of state funding. This is particularly the case with regard to measures to increase 
interconnectivity of the infrastructures needed to transfer energy within the integrated 
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European energy market.  There is also strong support for what is considered to be an 
‘ambitious’ programme of energy efficiency measures at local, regional, national and EU 
levels 
45 as outlined in the Commission Action Plan of 19
th October 2006. 
46 A great deal 
of state aid is required in order to advance the renewable technology and energy 
efficiency developments. It appears somewhat contradictory to castigate, in the interests 
of the market, support to the electro-nuclear industry and not to these other aspects of 
energy policy developments.  
 
b) Safety related issues 
 
Safety issues surrounding the nuclear sector became particularly prominent on the EU’s 
policy agenda in the early 1990s as the prospect of enlargement to states of the former 
Soviet Union in Central and Eastern Europe became more realistic. Many of the reactors 
at the nuclear power plants in the candidate states were based on similar, graphite 
moderated light water reactors (RBMK) to those the nuclear power plant in Chernobyl. 
The Chernobyl explosion in 1986 had been the result of a combination of 7 examples of 
human error. However other problems were evident in  the Chernobyl type reactors as   
the safety standards appeared to have been sacrificed to the needs of building reactors 
which would serve dual purposes and have the potential to meet both military and civilian 
needs. In addition to this the political structures in the former Soviet Union left great 
concerns about the failures of staff in the nuclear power plants to have developed an 
overall safety culture.  
 
Once the formal application and accession process was begun the prospective new 
member states were the subject of intensive review by the EU’s institutions of all areas of 
their economic and political development to determine if they fulfilled the core 
requirements and conditions of membership. Amongst these was the overall objective of 
bringing the nuclear reactors operating in the candidate states to the same standards of 
safe operation as those operating in the existing member states. A mandate was given to 
the Commission, and in particular the personnel of DG TREN, which enabled them to 
play a unique lead role in the investigation, analysis and monitoring of the various 
reactors in the candidate states.  
 
The mandate for the Commission was possible because of the powers given in the terms 
of the EURATOM Treaty. Working with the International Atomic Energy Agency and 
supported by the acceptance in the candidate states of the legal ‘acquis’  of the 
EURATOM Treaty, the Commission was involved in making recommendations which 
have led to closure of some reactors or the introduction of radical measures to improve 
safety in others. These closures have been the subject of much heated controversy 
amongst and between all the EU’s member states, old and new, those in which there is 
support for the industry and those where there is opposition to its use. However closure 
programmes have been carried out, supported by EU funding.  
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There is a high dependency on nuclear electricity in the new Member States with little 
prospect of quickly and easily finding alternatives and commitment to further 
developments. 
47 Whilst it was generally acknowledged that the EU has a comprehensive 
nuclear safety regime based on international standards there was nevertheless significant 
concern that as a result of the accession of the new states the measures might become less 
stringent. “It is no longer desirable to consider nuclear safety in a purely national perspective. 
Only a common approach can guarantee the maintenance of a high level of nuclear safety in an 
enlarged EU…”
48.  In 2002 the European Commission introduced a Nuclear Safety 
Strategy including a series of legislative measures targeting safety at nuclear installations 
and also national arrangements for funding to de-commission reactors. The view of the 
Commission was that this legislation should be in place before the New Member States 
acceded in 2004.
49  
 
The objective of the proposed legislation was to change aspects of the ‘non-binding’ 
acquis 
50 of voluntary harmonisation of national safety practices. The national regulatory 
authorities were to retain responsibility for safety at the national installations but with 
increased competence for the EU in the monitoring of the national provisions. An 
important element of the proposed legislation was a definition of nuclear installations to 
be any civilian facility and its associated land, buildings or equipment used throughout 
the nuclear fuel cycle until the facility was cleared of any radiological restrictions placed 
on its use. This includes the processing, use, handling, storage and disposal (temporarily 
or permanently) of radioactive materials and would bring into the competence of the EU 
aspects of the safe management of high level radioactive waste which is a major problem 
for the industry.  
 
The legal basis for these proposals came from several articles of the EURATOM Treaty. 
Article 2b) stipulates that the Community should establish uniform safety standards to 
protect the health of workers and the general public and ensure that they are applied. 
Article 30 gives greater clarity and definition of what the expression ‘standards’ means. 
Article 31 provides for the scrutiny of the legislation by a group of scientific experts 
appointed by the Member States and consultation of the European Parliament. Article 32 
provides for revision of the basis safety standards. Although these articles do not include 
the safety of the installations, a ruling by the European Court of Justice in December 
2002 
51 had confirmed that the technical competence of national authorities to deal with 
the safety of nuclear installations did not preclude the EU from legislating on the issue. In 
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the opinion of the ECJ, it was not appropriate for the safety of the workers and the public 
to be seen in some way as separate to the issue of safety of the installations themselves.  
 
Under the terms of the EURATOM Treaty there is no requirement for the Council of 
Ministers to do anything more than formally consult the EP on proposed measures. In 
practice the European Commission does take the concerns of the EP into account and 
there is much co-operation between the two institutions
52. This co-operation was 
demonstrated during the discussions about these legislative proposals. More than 100 
amendments to the proposed legislation were identified by the European Parliament 
during 2003. Many of these proposals were focused on the provisions dealing with the 
national financing arrangements for de-commissioning. The European Commission view 
was that the EP’s expectations on financing were too high and would not be acceptable to 
the Council of Ministers. EP amendments which were adopted were those relating to 
public information dissemination and research and technology development.  
 
In November 2003 there was deadlock in the Council of Ministers as the Swedish, 
Finnish and British governments proposed a non-legally binding alternative to the 
proposed directives.  The commitment of the European Commission for the proposals 
remained unaltered. “A Community intervention is indispensable to guarantee the maintenance 
of a high level of nuclear safety within the enlarged European Union….The absence of 
Community legislation would be prejudicial to Community citizens and to the interest of the 
enlarged EU.” 
53 Amendments were introduced but the proposals were still un-adopted in 
spring 2007 as a result of the strength of the national interests which had opposed it.   
 
Of all the concerns which are currently affecting the electronuclear industry this is the 
most difficult to address.  It encompasses a number of areas amongst which are safe 
disposal of the radioactive waste, safe de-commissioning of nuclear plants at the end of 
their operational lives in addition to concerns about the possible use by terrorists of attack 
of nuclear installations or the use of materials intended for civilian purposes for weapons 
manufacture. Lack of accurate information often plays a factor in public disquiet about 
forms of technology developments. The media plays an important role in the safety 
debate. The Chernobyl accident received media attention and it was the publicity of   
horrific injuries to those who were amongst the first to tackle the fires in the reactor 
which have become associated by many people with the whole industry. 
 
                                                 
52 This relationship between the European Parliament and the European Commission is more than informal 
willingness to co-operate it is supported also by the Framework Agreement on relations between the two 
institutions which was signed in 2000 and renewed in 2005. This agreement covers areas of dialogue and 
political co-operation between the two institutions, political responsibility, the flow of information and 
organisation of parliamentary proceedings. These points are expanded in annexes to the agreements 
pointing to the involvement of the EP in international relations and the transmission of confidential 
information. 
53 CEC (2004:4) Amended proposal for Council Directive (EURATOM) laying down basic obligations and 
general principles on the safety of nuclear installations and amended proposal for Council Directive 
(EURATOM) on the safe management of spent nuclear fuels and radioactive waste, COM (2004) 526 final, 
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With the passage of time people’s concerns about Chernobyl have been quietened 
particularly as the plant is now closed and assurances about the nature of similar 
technology used elsewhere have been made. Instead “Public opinion surveys conducted by 
the European Commission show that while they know little about radioactive waste….(they are) 
concerned about it and have very little trust in the nuclear industry”  and “….ninety percent of 
respondents thought that the lack of a decision on how to dispose of high level waste had a 
negative effect on the image of nuclear energy” 
54. It would therefore appear that for many 
people the safe disposal of the radioactive waste is the major concern and if that was 
resolved then there would be more popular support for the nuclear option.  
 
Setting aside new nuclear plant construction which may come from the pressure of the 
pro-nuclear environmental lobby, about one third of the EU’s electricity needs are 
currently met by nuclear generation. It is unlikely that this will alter to any major extent 
in the foreseeable future. Waste has been generated already and it will continue to be 
produced. As EU states de-commission older reactors or respond to the concerns of their 
populations for phase out of the nuclear capacity appropriate management of spent 
nuclear fuels and other forms of radioactive waste has become of vital importance. Low 
level waste is disposed of in shallow burial sites and facilities, some waste is stored in 
ponds in order to reduce its temperature before storage. How to deal with the long term 
management of the most dangerous, albeit relatively small, amounts of high level and 
long lived intermediate waste have still to be addressed. After fifty years of operation of 
the nuclear industry there is a considerable amount of these materials in intermediate 
storage facilities to be dealt with.   
 
Despite media speculation early in 2004 
55 that the UK government was considering 
shooting high level waste at the sun, the scientific evidence favours the more earthbound 
concept of deep geological disposal. Discussion of the development of regional facilities 
which may be used by more than one member state has begun. While there appear to be 
no technical difficulties to geological disposal the identification of appropriate sites has 
not yet been made. In the proposed 2002 legislation objectives to promote the 
development of common standards and good practice with regard to spent nuclear fuel 
and radioactive waste management, requirements for the EU member states to establish 
clearly defined programmes for waste management, to encourage more co-ordination of 
the research into waste disposal across the EU and to encourage greater public 
involvement and transparency within the sector were made. The legislation has not yet 
been adopted but the measures took their legality from the EURATOM Treaty and have 
raised the issues for debate amongst the EU’s 27 Member States. 
 
Whilst the UK remains one of the EU states which does not support these legislative 
proposals, in 2006 the UK House of Lords Select Committee on the EU concluded that an 
important role did exist for the EU to take a lead in safe management and disposal of 
radioactive waste because of “…..grave concerns that Member States are failing to educate 
                                                 
54 Taylor D.M. (2005) “The Management of Radioactive waste in the EU- opinions, situation and proposals 
for changes” in “Practice Periodical of Hazardous, Toxic and Radioactive Waste Management”, January 
55 Brown P (2004:3) “Shoot it at the sun” The Guardian, April 14
th. 
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citizens about the use of nuclear power, how the safety of nuclear installations is maintained and 
of the action taken and options available to Member States to manage the radioactive waste 
produced”
56 The EURATOM Treaty gives the opportunity to establish a legal framework 
to support the exhortation to ensure that the general public in all Member States is 
encouraged to become involved in these decisions through open and transparent public 
debates.  
 
The consequence of the failures of technology, poorly informed technical staff and poorly 
constructed technology at Chernobyl had resulted in a view from the industry itself that 
negligence is the ‘devil’ of the sector. The trans-national impact of the radioactive fallout 
from the Chernobyl reactor was still apparent across Europe in April 2007. Pressure has 
therefore been maintained within the EU member states and from the European 
Commission as well to ensure that a very stringent system of regulation of the industry is 
in place. 
 
c) Nuclear non-proliferation and the EURATOM Treaty 
 
This paper is concerned with the peaceful use of the technology to generate electricity but 
of major concern are a number of security matters which have the potential to be 
exacerbated as a result of the growth of interest in nuclear generated electricity. They 
include global disquiet about the access to weapons of mass destruction in some 
politically unstable states and the possibility, in the post 9/11 world, of terrorist groups 
gaining access to nuclear materials. Similar types of advanced technologies are involved 
in both civilian and military use of the nuclear materials to the extent that the description 
of  ‘Siamese twins’ of nuclear power has been applied – the military atom and the civilian 
atom 
57. In the EU’s 2000 Green Paper on security of energy supply this aspect of the 
technology was indeed highlighted as nuclear energy was categorised under the heading 
of  “a less than perfect energy option…(one of the) undesirables…..a source of energy in 
doubt…tainted by the original sin of dual usage – civil and military”
58. Indeed the UK and 
France, as holders of nuclear weapons in the EU, had developed their military capabilities 
before they began to use nuclear technology to generate electricity in the 1950s. 
 
Pressure on the availability of high grade ore 
59 for both types of developments will lead 
to more emphasis on recovery and re-processing in turn leading to expansion of 
capabilities in developments in the technologies in those states globally which are users 
of nuclear electricity. As a result levels of concern about security and nuclear weapons 
proliferation are increasing with these global developments in the civilian use of the 
technology (cf Annex ? for numbers of reactors operating and planned globally). 
 
                                                 
56 House of Lords (2006:para.110)” Managing nuclear safety and waste: the role of the EU” EU 
Committee 37
th Report 2005-2006, July 6
th.  
57 Hannes Alven, Swedish Noble Prize winning nuclear physicist cited in Barnaby F and Kemp J (2007:10) 
“Secure Energy civil nuclear power, security and global warming” Briefing Paper, March, Oxford Research 
Group, www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk.  
58 (CEC) (2000:31-32), Towards a European Strategy for the security of energy supply – Green Paper  
COM (2000) 769 final, Brussels, November 
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Nuclear non proliferation represents a major plank of the European Union’s Security and 
Defense policy (ESDP). But the variations which exist amongst the EUs’ Member States 
on questions relating to nuclear weapons strategy add to the difficulties of adopting a 
coherent approach to the ESDP. Furthermore it is difficult to envisage a situation where 
the governments of either the UK or France (the only states of the EU with nuclear 
weapons) would accept any European action which might impinge on their national 
nuclear weapons policies.  
 
Two treaties have an impact on the approach to nuclear non proliferation which the EU 
may adopt – the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (1
st July 1968) (NPT) 
60 and its statues 
on safeguards of materials and the EURATOM Treaty. India, Pakistan and Israel are 
known to have nuclear weapons and have not signed the NPT and North Korea is now 
withdrawn. France and the UK of the 188 signatory states of the NPT are declared 
Nuclear Weapons States (the others being the USA, Russia and China). Some NATO 
countries, the EU Member States of Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, Greece 
and the applicant state Turkey, have forces which are trained to use US nuclear weapons. 
All the NPT signatory states (those which are nuclear weapons states and those which 
have agreed to exclusively peaceful uses of the technology) have voluntary agreements 
and protocols with the IAEA for inspection to ensure that nucleqr materials are not being 
diverted to military use.  
 
There is overlap in the work of the IAEA and the European Commission on nuclear 
safeguards. The safety regime which has been adopted within the EU is based on the 25 
safety principles of the IAEA which are also the basis of the International Convention on 
Nuclear Safety.  In instances of duplication of effort the IAEA procedures are invoked to 
verify that those of the EURATOM Treaty have been adhered to. The advantage of the 
EURATOM Treaty and its monitoring of nuclear materials is that of the range of 
safeguards which have been introduced. For the IAEA and its monitoring through 
inspection of what is happening in nuclear power plants issues of non-compliance with 
the terms of the NPT are harder to determine. Through the European Safeguards Agency 
the EU states have in place a more comprehensive and effectively monitored system.  
 
d) Something for everyone? 
 
 The primary objective of the EURATOM Treaty is to support the development of the 
nuclear industry and provision for funding for research and technology developments was 
included in the Treaty in 1957 (Article 7 EURATOM). The TEC on the other hand had 
no such provision for research and technology funding it its original provisions.     
However, since the 1980s, the EU’s has developed a successive series of Research and 
Technology Development (RTD) programmes, which now include the EURATOM 
programmes. In the Seventh Framework RTD programme (FP7) proposed by the 
European Commission (2007-2013) the proposals for funding of the EURATOM 
Research Programme were also identified. But FP7 is a multi-annual programme to run 
                                                 
60 The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty has 188 signatory states and is the major international Treaty 
dealing with use of nuclear weapons. However the states of Israel, Pakistan and India where nuclear 
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for seven years, and the EURATOM regulations are for a multi-annual programme for 
five years. The possibility of an extension of the EURATOM funding is included for 
2011-2013 to bring the funding for both areas into line and enable more effective 
management of the transfer of the funds to the national level. The EURATOM budget 
was not forwarded for scrutiny to the European Parliament with the other elements of the 
FP7 Budget, as this is not a requirement under the terms of the Treaty. 
 
Agreement on the budget for the EURATOM Research Programme 2007-2011 was 
difficult to achieve because of the divergent views of the national governments about 
further developments in nuclear fission technology.  The Austrian government exercised 
its prerogative of veto with regard to funding for nuclear fission 
61 technology, other than 
that  associated with decommissioning reactors and safe disposal of radioactive waste. 
Agreement was eventually reached in the Council of Ministers on July 24
th 2006 with the 
bulk of available funding being directed to new fusion 
62 technology developments. The 
resolution of the controversy on this funding showed the versatility of the EURATOM 
Treaty to respond to the concerns of those who are not in favour of the continued use of 
nuclear technology as well as those Member States which are.   
 
Of the total budget for EURATOM research of 2.7 billion euros, 2.1 billion are to be 
allocated to fusion research and in particular the development of the International 
Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) which is under the auspices of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).  The agreement for the ITER  development 
in Cadarache , France, was signed in June 2006 and will include input from partners in 
Japan, China, India, Russia, South Korea and the United States. The ITER development 
is regarded by many as having the potential to make a major contribution to sustainable 
and secure energy supplies in Europe but is unlikely to be at the stage of commercial 
production before 2050 because of the difficulties of achieving and maintaining the high 
temperatures needed for the reaction to take place.  
 
Conclusions 
 
There are many problems to be overcome by the European Union in the search for a 
sustainable and secure energy policy and the EURATOM Treaty adds to the complexities 
involved in this search. Yet there appears to be little political willingness to take step to 
repeal the Treaty. Although considered to be one of the ‘founding’ Treaties of the EU the 
EURATOM Treaty is dealing with a limited aspect of policy development contributing to 
the +energy sector. It is based on inter-governmental action between the signatory states 
of the European Atomic Energy Community. The argument of this paper has been that 
the national differences which created a Treaty focusing on a limited sector of economic 
policy in 1957 were those of a crowded national energy policy environment which made 
                                                 
61 Nuclear fission – is the process of splitting molecules of uranium-235 in order to produce energy and is 
the basis of the nuclear technology currently used. 
62 Nuclear fusion – is the process of fusing two hydrogen atoms to form a single atom of helium. One 
gramme of the fuel produced can develop the same energy as 45 barrels of oil. However the process 
requires extremely high temperatures which it  is not yet possible to achieve in a reactor. 
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consensus difficult. There may be some changes in the national nuclear energy policies in 
2007 but national differences and lack of consensus are as deeply entrenched as they 
were in 1957. It was difficult to achieve agreement on its terms in 1957. The national 
governments continue to be deeply divided about the use of nuclear technology half a 
century later and so negotiations on integrated action would be as difficult to accomplish 
in 2007.  
 
As a sector specific Treaty there is no opportunity or willingness for policy bargaining 
amongst the national governments to produce an alternative.  The national governments 
of the EU continue to ‘jealously’ guard their competence to choose their national energy 
policies, particularly their rights to choose the mix of energy resources which they use. 
The question of ‘political willingness’ to make changes to the EURATOM Treaty  is 
more than the willingness of the Member States to tackle the controversial issues which 
surround the use of nuclear electricity. National governments are indeed reluctant to open 
this sector to supranational action but the role of the European Commission is also a 
factor which has to be considered.  
 
In the two areas of liberalisation in the development of the single energy market and 
safety and security in the nuclear sector a considerable degree of control has been passed 
to the European Commission as the supranational authority with the competence to deal 
with the issues. The Treaty conferred competences on the European Commission and its 
officials have developed a considerable expertise in dealing with nuclear safeguard 
controls in EU nuclear installations and the monitoring of levels of radioactive materials 
in the environment including radioactive waste. The terms of the EURATOM Treaty 
gave the Commission a role as a de-politicised and ‘benevolent’ technocracy based on a 
model outlined and supported by Monnet. As the Treaty has remained substantially 
unaltered since its ratification 50 years ago this is the approach and model which 
continues to define the role of the European Commission in the area of nuclear safety and 
security. 
 
Overall there was little consensus for an extensive debate on the European Atomic 
Energy Community and the repeal of the EURATOM Treaty shown during the 
deliberations of the Convention on the Future of Europe (2002/2003) and the 
Intergovernmental Conference which followed (2004). Few proposals made post 2005 
have included discussion of the EURATOM Treaty. As the deliberations have continued 
through the German presidency of 2007 about the Constitutional Treaty and the future 
architecture of the European Union there appears to be little likelihood that the outcome 
will be a ‘grand design’ focusing on all aspects of the EU’s activities. It is more likely 
that the outcome will be a limited number of easily demonstrable reforms with an 
extension of the period of reflection into 2008 to deal with other issues. The outcome for 
the EURATOM Treaty appears to be the current status quo – ie a Treaty with a separate 
legal personality, outdated, undemocratic, an alien dinosaur in the liberalized energy 
market of the EU, but one which has the capacity to deal with some issues which the 
Member States of the EU would rather not spend time negotiating on in other forums.  
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Annex 1 Number of reactors by Member and Candidate State (to August 2006) 
 
  % of national 
electricity 
produced by the 
nuclear sector 
Number of operable 
reactors 
Reactors under 
construction 
Reactors 
planned and 
proposed 
Belgium   55  7     
UK 19  23     
Finland  26 4    1  
France 78  59    2 
Netherlands  4 1    
Spain 23  9     
Sweden 52  10     
Germany 32  17     
Czech  Rep  41 6   2 
Hungary 34  4     
Lithuania(1) 72  1    1* 
Slovakia  55 6   2 
Slovenia(2) 39  1     
Bulgaria  44 4   2 
Romania 8  1  1  3 
Croatia   (with  Slovenia)     
Turkey(3)   0    3/5 
EU 27 + 
candidates 
 152  2  11 
World   442 28  204  (4) 
Source: various European Commission and IAEA. 
 
Notes  
(1)Lithuania, planned new nuclear power plant with Latvia, Estonia and Poland 
(2)Croatia, No nuclear power plant of its own but Croatian national electricity company has co-
ownership of plant at Krsko in Slovenia 
(3)Turkey, accession to the EU estimated by 2020 
(4) 68 of the global total of planned reactors are in China EUSA 0507 EURATOM Treaty  32
Annex 2 Comparison of costs of selected sources of electricity production 
 
 Coal  Gas  Nuclear  Wind  Hydro  Solar 
Construction times 
in years 
4 2-3  4-5 1-2 Na  (3)  Na 
Lifetime of use in 
years 
45 25  30-60  Na  Na  Na 
Cost (2005) in 
euros/MWh (1) 
30-50 35-75  40-45  35-175  25-95  140-430 
Projected cost 
(2030) 
Euros/MWh with 
20-30  
euros/t(CO2)  
45-70 40-85  40-45  28-170  25-90  55-260 
Investment costs as 
% of total costs 
30 15  50  Na  Na  Na 
GHG emissions 
(kg CO2 eq/MWh) 
750-800 400-
440 
15 10-30  5-20  100 
EU 27 Import 
dependency 
2005 
 
 
 
 
2030 
 
Proven 
reserves/Annual 
Production 
 
 
39% 
 
 
 
 
59% 
 
155 years 
 
 
 
57% 
 
 
 
 
82% 
 
64 
years 
 
 
 
Almost 
100% for 
uranium ores 
(2) 
 
 
85 years of 
reasonable 
reserves 
 
 
 
 
Nil 
 
 
 
 
Renewable 
 
 
 
 
Nil 
 
 
 
 
Renewable 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nil 
 
 
 
 
Renewable 
Operation and 
maintenance costs 
as % of total costs 
20 10  30  13  Na  Na 
Efficiency 40-48%  40-50%  33% 95-98%  95-98%  Na 
Fuel costs % of 
total costs 
45 80-90  20  Na  Na  Na 
Fuel price 
sensitivity 
Medium Very 
high 
Low Nil  Nil  Nil 
Source Various – IEA and Commission 
Notes  
(1)  Dependent on the technology used  
(2)  Uranium is however available from a wide range of sources including reprocessing. Also in the 
opinion of the Nuclear Industry Association “ ….it would be possible to purchase the entire 
lifetime supply for a reactor and stockpile it next to the reactor if it was considered that there was 
any danger to supplies” House of Lords (2006:83)” Managing nuclear safety and waste: the role 
of the EU” EU Committee 37
th Report 2005-2006, July 6
th. 
(3)  Na Comparable figures not available 
 
 